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PART I: INTRODUCTION 
The concept of market dominance is central to 
competition law in New Zealand, Australia, the United 
States and the EEC. Although different terminology 
is used in the different jurisdictions, the general 
idea is to address the potential for competitive 
harm. The law relating to market dominance generally 
works in tandem with the law of mergers and 
takeovers, the aim of which is to prevent firms from 
acquiring market dominance to the extent that this 
results in a lack of effective competition in a 
market. For firms already dominant in a market, the 
law of market dominance operates to place a special 
burden on them, which is intended to provide the 
antidote to consumer exploitation normally provided 
by competition. 
The premise underlying the law of market dominance is 
that where there is dominance there is exploitative 
potential, and competition is apt to be thwarted. 
Competition, the antithesis of market dominance, is 
inherently a good thing. This is so regardless of 
possible beneficial effects of market dominance, for 
instance economies of scale. The firms most likely 
to be caught are those with entrenched market power 
which have operated in regulated sectors in the past 
without the need to worry about new or potential 
entrants. This is consistent with a move towards a 
more deregulated economy in which competition is 
encouraged. This paper focusses on section 36 of the 
New Zealand Commerce Act 1986 and the issues that 
arise out of the cases which have been decided since 
the inception of the Act. Section 36 reads: 1 
1 Section 36(2) and (3) have been omitted since they 
are not relevant to the discussion in this paper. 
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36(1) [Dominant position} No person who has a 
dominant position in a market shall use that position 
for the purpose of -
(a) Restricting the entry of any person into that or 
any other market; or 
(b) Preventing or deterring any person from engaging 
in competitive conduct in that or any other market; 
or 
(c) Eliminating any person from that or any other 
market. 
In general section 36 is an ex ante, not an ex post, 
test, which assumes there is a precise way of telling 
in advance whether practices will be anti-
competitive. It has twin objectives, to ensure that 
there are disincentives for firms to pursue 
particular forms of conduct, and to ensure that 
legitimate competitive conduct is not stifled. This 
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
competitive conduct is critical for the short- and 
long-term business decisions of the many New Zealand 
firms with market power. 
Section 36 encapsulates an economic concept in a 
statutory provision. Although the interdependence of 
the two disciplines of law and economics is 
recognised, an essentially legal approach is taken in 
the courts. Some problems arise from this, for 
instance that lawyers concentrate on words, their 
order and the meaning of each, not necessarily in its 
context. As a result the interpretation of the 
section has become a matter of applying a number of 
separate threshold tests, each of which must be 
crossed before the section will apply. To some 
degree the economic concept has been obscured in the 
process, and the results do not always reflect a 
principled approach. The judgments to which lay 
assessors contributed are different both in layout 
and methodology from those where lay assessors were 
2 
absent. 2 The cases reflect the different points of 
view. 
Different points of view are also found in the 
differing versions of the tests in section 36. 
Section 36 must be interpreted to allow a wide range 
of activities and proscribe only a small range, 
otherwise the market risks being unreasonably 
curtailed. The courts have been inconsistent in 
their approach, resulting in confusion as to whether 
all activities of a dominant firm fall within the 
section, with the purpose test as the limiting 
factor, or whether the scope of the section is 
confined to activities that constitute use of the 
dominant position. If the latter were the case, 
comparatively few of a dominant firm's activities 
would be subject to a purpose enquiry. A possible 
result would be that activities that were found not 
to be use of the dominant position could be taken by 
firms for anti-competitive purposes, yet attract no 
further action. 
A further area of inconsistency relates to the 
approach to the definition of market. Although this 
has generally been considered the first issue to be 
decided, a recent case suggests this approach is 
wrong and that the concepts of market and dominance 
cannot be analysed separately. 
Another issue arises in the application and 
effectiveness of the purpose tests. There is no 
agreement on whether the test is subjective or 
objective. This affects the ease of proof of a 
proscribed purpose. Another problem is that taken 
literally, the words of the purpose tests focus on 
2 Compare the judgments in Magic Millions and the 
Chathams Island case on the one hand with Port Nelson 
on the other for an example of different methodology 
and layout. 
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the competitor to the degree that one might conclude 
that protection of the competitor was the aim of the 
section. Courts have consistently stated that the 
aim of the Act is to promote competition, which is 
assumed to be in the best interest of consumers, 
rather than protect competitors. There may be some 
conflict between the words of the section and the aim 
of the Act. Since protection of competition may to 
some extent depend on protection of the competitor 
the test of purpose must balance two apparently 
conflicting objectives. The cases illustrate how 
this conflict is worked out in practice. 
The concept of market power is critical to 
competition law since it is the antithesis of 
competition. The next section of the paper discusses 
the New Zealand perspective of market power, or 
''dominance" as it is referred to in New Zealand, and 
relates it to similar concepts in other 
jurisdictions. Then the facts of the New Zealand 
cases are described to set the stage for more 
detailed consideration of the issues raised above in 
the context of the cases in which they arise. Some 
general problems with section 36 are then discussed 
followed by concluding remarks. 
PART II: THE CONCEPT OF MARKET POWER 
In competition law an understanding of the concept of 
market power is critical, since a determination of 
the degree of market power is often a prerequisite to 
other enquiries. The rationale is that it is most 
unlikely that anti-competitive activities of a firm 
without market power will have appreciable 
4 
detrimental effects on competition in a market. Thus 
the legislation is concerned to eliminate these from 
further enquiry at the earliest stage. Section 1 of 
the United States Sherman Act 1890, for instance, 
prohibits agreements in restraint of trade. The test 
is applied as a two step process, first an assessment 
of the degree of market power, then if market power 
is found, an assessment of the degree of restraint of 
trade. A purpose enquiry under section 46 of the 
Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 is only made if 
the threshold for market power is crossed. Section 
36 operates in the same way. The section 36 test of 
''dominant position in a market" is based on Article 
86 of the EEC Treaty, which provides that: 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant 
position within the common market or in a substantial 
part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with 
the common market insofar as it may affect trade 
between Member States. 
such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase 
or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical 
development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to 
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject 
of such contracts. 
The definition of market dominance in the Commerce 
Act 1986 for the purposes of section 36 is found in 
section 3(8): 
Section 3(8) [Dominant position} For the purposes of 
sections 36 and 36A of this Act, a dominant position 
in a market is one in which a person as a supplier or 
acquirer of goods or services either alone or 
interconnected with any body corporate is in a 
position to exercise a dominant influence over the 
production, acquisition, supply, or price of goods or 
services in that market and for the purposes of 
determining whether a person is in a position to 
exercise a dominant influence over the production, 
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acquisition, supply, or price of goods or services in 
a market regard shall be had to -
(a) The share of the market, the technical 
knowledge, the access to materials or capital of that 
person or that person together with any 
interconnected body corporate: 
(b) The extent to which that person is constrained 
by the conduct of competitors or potential 
competitors in that market: 
(c) The extent to which that person is constrained 
by the conduct of suppliers or acquirers of goods or 
services in that market. 
The concept in section 3(8) has been encapsulated in 
a number of formulations including that of Maureen 
Brunt: 3 
Market power is essentially the power of a 
firm to "administer" its production and 
selling policies (for example its prices, 
its service, its capacity, its techniques) 
somewhat independently of market pressures: 
it is the extent to which a firm can "give 
less and charge more" without its market 
being undermined by rivals' incursions. 
Yet the firm may not choose to give less 
and charge more. Rather, it has the 
discretion to do so. And so we say the 
essence of market power is "discretionary 
power". 
The definition of market power in the United States 
introduces another dimension to that accepted in 
other jurisdictions. The most commonly used 
definition is found in the 1984 Department of Justice 
Merger Guidelines which state that market power is 
"the ability of one or more firms profitably to 
maintain prices above competitive levels for a 
significant period of time". The Guidelines stress 
the word "profitably" because in a competitive market 
a firm raising prices above the competitive level 
would gradually be forced out of business, whereas an 
absence of competition may be inferred if 
profitability can be sustained over time. 
3 M Brunt "'Market definition' issues in Australian 
and New Zealand trade practices litigation" (April 
1990) ABLR 86, 93. 
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The emphasis on profitability in the us formulation 
is not found in the definition of the European Court 
in Continental Can4, which is the definition most 
commonly quoted in New Zealand: 5 
Undertakings are in a dominant position 
when they have the power to behave 
independently, which puts them in a 
position to act without taking into account 
their competitors, purchasers or suppliers. 
That is the position when, because of their 
share of the market or their share of the 
market combined with the availability of 
technical knowledge, raw materials or 
capital, they have the power to determine 
prices or to control production or 
distribution for a significant part of the 
products in question. This power does not 
necessarily have to derive from an absolute 
domination permitting the undertakings 
which hold it to eliminate all will on the 
part of their economic partners, but it is 
enough that they be strong enough as a 
whole to ensure to those undertakings an 
overall independence of behaviour, even if 
there are differences in intensity in their 
influence on the different partial markets. 
A problem with the European Court's definition is 
that very few firms would be in a position such as 
they describe. For most there would be some 
elasticity of demand that would eventually erode 
profitability. The definition is somewhat one-
dimensional. The us definition adds the concept of 
time so that dominance is defined as a position of 
power over time. It is not the power a firm has in 
the short term since most firms, regardless of 
dominance, have this kind of discretion, but power in 
the long term. The time period would be that length 
of time within which one would expect competition to 
materialise if there were no hindrances in the form 
of actions of the firm or the nature of the market. 
4 Re Continental Can Co Inc (1972] CMLR 011. 
5 Above n4, 027. 
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The nature of the market is closely related to the 
concept of dominance, since it dictates the 
circumstances in which dominance may or may not be 
found. A wide definition of market lessens the 
chances of dominance being found, and conversely a 
narrow definition enhances the risk for an 
influential firm. The nature of the market is 
established by looking at a number of factors 
including the existence of large market shares, large 
investment requirements, surplus capacity, 
profitability, production of a range of products, 
efficiency as a result of economies of scale and 
vertical integration. Additional barriers to entry 
may be created by law, such as patent rights or 
exclusive contracts. The definition of market will 
be further discussed below in Part IV. 
Of the nine decisions made in New Zealand courts 
since the Act was introduced, four6 never proceeded 
beyond an application for an interim injunction and 
are therefore limited in the extent of their 
consideration of the issues raised under section 36, 
and five7 were decided in the High Court with two of 
6 Chatham Islands Fishermans Co-Operative Company 
Limited v Chatham Islands Packing Company Limited@ 
Others Unreported, 22 November 1988, High Court 
Wellington Registry cp 874/88; Telecom Corporation 
of New Zealand Limited v Sanda Communications (NZ) 
Limited Unreported, 20 September 1989, High Court 
Wellington Registry, cp 592/89; Bond@ Bond Limited 
@ Anor v Fisher@ Paykel Ltd@ Anor (1986) 6 NZAR 
278; (1987) 1 NZBLC 102,622; Glaxo New Zealand Ltd 
v The Attorney General Unreported, 9 March 1990, High 
Court Auckland Registry cl 6/90; Unreported, 12 June 
1990, Court of Appeal 81/89. 
7 Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars 
(Auckland Airport) Limited@ Others [1987) 2 NZLR 
647; (1988) 2 NZBLC 103,041; The New Zealand Apple 
and Pear Marketing Board@ Anor v Apple Fields 
Limited@ Anor [1989) 3 NZLR 158; (1989) 2 NZBLC 
103,564 (HCT); (1989) 2 NZBLC 103,741 (CA); New 
Zealand Magic Millions Ltd@ Anor v Wrightson 
Bloodstock Ltd (1990) 3 NZBLC 101,501; Tru Tone Ltd 
v Festival Records Retail Marketing Ltd (1988) 2 
NZBLC 99,113 (HCT); (1988) 2 NZBLC 103,286 (CA); 
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these going on to the Court of Appeal. All cases 
were initiated by private parties rather than the 
Commerce Commission. Part III of the paper describes 
the facts of the nine cases in the order in which 
they were decided. Some of the cases are included 
for completeness and to illustrate the types of 
situations in which section 36 was invoked. They do 
not all provoke further discussion. Others, however, 
raise issues that are fully discussed in Parts IV, V, 
VI and VII of the paper. 
PART III: THE NEW ZEALAND CASES 
Fisher and Paykel 8 
Fisher and Paykel was NZ's only manufacturer of white 
goods which it distributed to retailers under 
exclusive dealership arrangements. It had about 85% 
of the market. The plaintiff, a retailer, opened an 
electrical goods supermarket in Auckland which it 
wished to stock with a wide range of goods, including 
white goods of other brands. Fisher and Paykel 
refused to deal under these conditions and the 
plaintiff sought an interim injunction. The 
plaintiff alleged among other things that Fisher and 
Paykel was in breach of section 36 by using its 
dominant position for one of the proscribed purposes. 
The Court found there was a serious issue to be 
tried, since it was a reasonable inference that a 
purpose of the defendant's conduct was to use its 
dominance to deter competitive conduct in the market. 
Union Shipping New Zealand Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd 
(1990) 3 NZBLC 101,618. 
8 Above n6. 
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The Court, however, rejected the application on the 
balance of convenience. 
The Auckland Regional Authority (ARA) had statutory 
authority to administer and operate the Auckland 
International Airport. Two rental car companies, 
Avis and Hertz, had contracted with the ARA to 
provide and operate rental vehicle services at the 
airport with the proviso that no more licences with 
other rental car agencies would be given by ARA. 
Budget, a rental car company in competition with Avis 
and Hertz, claimed that by virtue of sections 27, 29 
and 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 ARA was not bound by 
the proviso and was free to negotiate with Budget. 
The proceedings were brought by ARA which sought a 
declaration of the Court as to whether it was bound 
by its contracts or whether it was bound by the 
Commerce Act 1986 to negotiate. Barker J found no 
breach of section 29, but a breach of both sections 
27 and 36. 
The Chatham Islands case10 
The defendants owned and controlled the only wharf 
facilities in the small community of Kaingaroa on the 
Chatham Islands. Until the plaintiffs, who had 
started their own fish processing cooperative in the 
Chathams, opened a rival plant at Kaingaroa, the 
defendants were operating the only local fish 
9 Above n7. 
10 Above n6. 
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processing plant. The defendants' plant was located 
at the landward end of the wharf and access to the 
wharf was obtained through the plant premises. The 
local fishers habitually discharged their catch onto 
the defendants' wharf for processing at the 
defendants' plant, however the plaintiffs' co-
operative had grown since its inception in 1988 to 
account for about 70% of the fish caught from the 
Chathams, and its members in Kaingaroa wished to 
patronise the plaintiffs' local facility. The 
defendants issued circulars stating that suppliers of 
the plaintiffs would not be permitted to use a number 
of facilities such as bait sales, access to credit, 
and use of the wharf. Fishers unable to use the 
wharf were forced to use dinghies to transport their 
catch and equipment. The defendants pointed out that 
when a major storm destroyed the wharf all fishers 
used dinghies till the defendants rebuilt the wharf, 
thus proving that it was a viable alternative. In an 
application for an interlocutory injunction, the 
plaintiffs alleged among other causes of action a 
breach of section 36. In an oral judgment Eichelbaum 
J found that the defendants were indeed in breach. 
The Sanda case11 
Sanda Communications was a small telecommunications 
company set up in Auckland in competition with 
Telecom, after deregulation of the telecommunications 
market. It leased from Telecom two megabits of space 
on the Auckland to Wellington link for which it had 
not paid. Telecom threatened to cut off the link. 
Sanda accused Telecom of a variety of discriminatory 
actions including non-performance of contract, 
statements by its officers prejudicial to Sanda's 
11 Above n6. 
11 
reputation with its clients, and breach of section 
36. Due to the investment of time and effort 
required to answer the allegations, Telecom conceded 
that there was an arguable case and defended it on 
the basis of the balance of convenience. The Court 
made orders restraining Telecom from cutting the link 
but subject to Sanda paying current rental rates. 
The Court found that Telecom was indisputably 
dominant in the telecommunications market. The fact 
that the Court made orders against Telecom suggests 
that the Court thought the pending substantive 
hearing might find Telecom in breach of section 36, 
though this is by no means clear. The Court observed 
that the orders made "should impress upon Telecom 
that its obligation is to trade fairly, even 
scrupulously, until the substantive issues are 
decided". 12 It is not possible to read into this 
statement that Telecom was in breach. However, it 
suggests that there is a special burden on dominant 
firms where small competitors exist, and the fact 
that the orders made meant Telecom could not exercise 
its contractual right to terminate service for unpaid 
debts suggests that the burden on dominant firms goes 
beyond normal commercial considerations, perhaps as 
far as special concessions. As mentioned above, it 
is not certain that this conclusion is based on the 
judge's perception of section 36 obligations. It is 
more likely that the foundation for the orders was 
Telecom's concession, and therefore the case has 
little to say about section 36. 
12 Above n6, 11. 
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Apple Fields 13 
In 1988 proceedings were brought in the High Court by 
Apple Fields Ltd against the New Zealand Apple and 
Pear Marketing Board and the New Zealand Fruit 
Growers' Federation. Apple Fields claimed the Board 
and the Federation had acted in concert to impose 
practices in breach of the freedom of competition 
provisions of the Commerce Act 1986. The Board and 
the Federation had acted pursuant to sections 31 and 
32B of the Apple and Pear Marketing Act 1971 which 
the Board considered enabled it to impose unequal 
levies on different classes of growers. 
Since 1948 growers had been paying levies to the 
Board, which used the funds to acquire capital assets 
such as storage sheds and sorting facilities required 
for the marketing process. Recently production had 
increased dramatically with new entrants to the 
industry plus existing growers who were expanding 
their output. Since the Board is a statutory 
monopsony, the additional production meant there was 
considerable pressure on existing facilities and a 
requirement for additional facilities which had to be 
funded from levies. The Board and the Federation 
thought the new growers and the existing growers who 
were expanding should carry the major funding burden. 
Consequently the "new crop levy" was imposed, which 
differentiated between new and longer established 
growers, and between those maintaining and those 
expanding production. Considerable discussion was 
held by the Board and Federation indicating their 
concern that recent and prospective entrants to the 
industry would suffer hardship, and allowances were 
made for this. 
13 Above n7. 
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In the High court Apple Fields claimed among other 
things that the agreement between the Board and the 
Federation to impose differential levies was a trade 
practice that breached sections 27, 29 and 36 of the 
Commerce Act 1986. In relation to section 36, 
Holland J found without discussion that the Board 
with its monopsony had a dominant position in the 
market and had acted with a proscribed purpose. 
The Board and the Federation appealed the case to the 
Court of Appea1 14 on the basis that the judge was 
wrong to find that the arrangement was "likely to 
have the effect, of substantially lessening 
competition in a market" within section 27. They 
also sought to raise section 43. Cooke P, appearing 
to wish to clarify the meaning of "purpose" in 
sections 27, 29 and 36, found that not only did the 
arrangement have the effect of lessening competition, 
but that this was an instance when purpose and effect 
could not be separated, and the arrangement was not 
only in conflict with section 27, but also with 
sections 29 and 36. There was very little discussion 
of section 36. Cooke P merely indicated that: 15 
... the arrangement of the levy between the 
Board and the Federation, however, well 
motivated, has had a substantial purpose of 
deterring entry into the apple-growing 
industry or increases of production. 
The result was that there was a breach of both 
sections 27 and 36, but the Board was protected by 
the section 43 exemption. 
14 Above n7. 
15 Above n7, 103,745. 
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Magic Millions 16 
In Magic Millions the case concerned the actions of 
Wrightson Bloodstock in causing the date of its 
yearling thoroughbred auction near Auckland to 
coincide with that of Magic Millions, who had 
organised competing sales to take place at Trentham 
during the Wellington Spring Carnival. Wrightsons, 
who before the advent of Magic Millions had been the 
only player in the market, had conducted sales for 60 
years at Trentham on this weekend. It had, however, 
recently moved its sales location nearer Auckland, 
vacating the Trentham site. Before Magic Millions 
came on the scene Wrightsons had deferred to the 
wishes of the Wellington Racing Club and organised 
its sales around Auckland Anniversary Weekend so as 
not to conflict with the Wellington Spring Carnival, 
but when Magic Millions emerged in 1989 Wrightsons, 
stating in evidence a need to maintain "a competitive 
position", changed its sales dates to clash with 
those of Magic Millions, making it impossible for 
buyers and sellers to attend both auctions. 
Wrightsons not only changed its sale dates, but it 
allocated the sale dates between what became known as 
the Kl sale for premiere yearlings, and K2 which 
covered less valuable horses, tying buyers and 
sellers in the Kl and K2 submarkets together. 
The judge found Magic Millions' sale dates to be 
inflexible, in part due to the requirements of its 
sponsor. For 1989, negotiations ended with Wrightson 
changing its dates so as not to coincide with the 
Wellington Spring Carnival. However for 1990 
Wrightson again set its dates to clash with Magic 
Millions, insisting that the Commonwealth Games made 
it necessary. Negotiations failed and Magic Millions 
16 Above n7. 
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took Wrightsons to court alleging breach of section 
36. Tipping J found that there was a breach, and 
ordered Wrightsons to set its dates so as not to 
clash, for a period of three additional years. 
Festival Records17 
The plaintiffs (Tru Tone) were retailers and the 
defendants (Festival) distributors of albums, that 
is, records, tapes and discs. Festival did business 
with the retailers on an agency, commission, sale or 
return basis, which means that the retailer takes 
none of the risks associated with the decision to 
promote a particular album. Festival retained 
ownership of the albums which could be returned free 
of obligation by the retailer if the promotion did 
not achieve the desired result. Festival's 
philosophy of sales was to cater to a price-sensitive 
public by keeping the retail price down. This 
strategy was expected to generate maximum profits by 
maintaining high sales volume. Accordingly it 
charged retailers prices that were about 10% lower 
than those of other distributors. The retailers did 
not, however, respond with lower retail prices. 
During the period of the Commerce Act 1975 Festival 
did not insist on a maximum retail price due to the 
risk that it would conflict with the Act. After the 
Commerce Act 1986 was passed Festival introduced its 
maximum retail price, and when retailers failed to 
abide by it Festival cut off supply. The retailers 
brought the case to court pleading breach of sections 
27 and 36 . 
In the High Court, Smellie J and lay member Lang Esq 
found no breach of the Act. The retailers appealed 
17 Above n7. 
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to the Court of Appeal, which endorsed the decision 
of the High Court. The judgment of the Court was 
delivered by Richardson J, who drew attention to the 
fact that there was a lay member sitting on the High 
Court. This meant, he said, that additional weight 
was to be given to the Court's decision due to the 
expertise in economics and commerce. This expertise 
assisted the Court in assessing the conflicting 
evidence of the economic experts who appeared as 
witnesses for each side. Richardson J emphasised 
that the case fell for decision essentially on its 
own facts and was not to be considered as laying down 
any general principles of interpretation of the Act. 
The Court noted that the definitions of both of the 
crucial concepts found in the long title of the Act, 
"competition" and "market", indicate that a practical 
approach is to be taken in assessing the state of 
competition in a particular case. The description of 
"market" as a matter of fact and commercial common 
sense means that no particular criterion, for 
instance substitutability, is to be given undue 
prominence. "Market" is a multi-dimensional concept 
with dimensions of product, functional level, space 
and time. 
The High Court had concluded that the single album 
definition of market submitted by the plaintiffs 
lacked commercial reality. The Court of Appeal 
agreed, for the reasons that a narrow definition is 
like a snapshot rather than a more realistic moving 
picture of continuing commercial activity. 
Distributors acquire rights from artists on the basis 
of all albums they produce rather than for each 
individual album. New albums substitute for existing 
albums in a continuous process of displacement, and 
there is strong emphasis on differentiation to avoid 
the possibility of a whole range of substitutes. The 
17 
Court emphasised that the definition of market in 
this case would not necessarily be of help in another 
case, since "[t]he special factual basis of each 
decision renders pointless attempted comparisons 
between the present case and such cases". 18 
In its assessment of dominance the Court focussed on 
market share as the single most important 
consideration. Due to the size of the market as it 
was defined by the Court the resulting market share 
was not sufficient to create dominance. Festival had 
a modest share of the overall market for albums (6 
per cent) and there was abundant evidence of 
competitive activity on the part of its rival 
distributors. The Court said: 19 
The plaintiffs accordingly failed at the 
first hurdle under s 36 and it was not and 
is not necessary to go on to consider 
whether in insisting on maximum retail 
pricing RML used its dominant position in 
that market for the purpose of preventing 
or deterring any retailer from engaging in 
competitive conduct in that or any other 
market within s 36(1) (b), or of eliminating 
any retailer from that or any other market 
within s 36(1) (c). 
It is not possible from this passage to determine 
whether the Court, if dominance had been found, would 
have gone on to assess use of the position, or 
whether it would have focussed on purpose. 
18 Above n7, 103,293. 
19 Above n7, 103,294. 
18 
Port Nelson 20 
Port Nelson was a case involving a constructive 
refusal to supply and predatory pricing. Port Nelson 
Ltd had, as part of the Government's move to 
deregulate the country's ports, inherited the 
ownership of wharf facilities in Nelson from its 
predecessor the Nelson Harbour Board. It had 
amalgamated previously separate charges for services 
into a single charge for using wharf facilities. 
Under the reforms, it acquired the power to contract 
with third parties who used the ports. Using this 
power, it required Union Shipping New Zealand Ltd 
(USNZ) and Union stevedoring Services Ltd (USS) to 
use and pay for port company forklifts and drivers 
plus pay a wharf usage levy. USNZ and USS wished to 
arrange their own forklifts and drivers. To cement 
its position, Port Nelson demanded USNZ obtain a port 
users' licence, and included as a condition a 
contract restricting use of forklifts and drivers 
other than those of Port Nelson. One of the many 
causes of action asserted breach of section 36 
alleging that Port Nelson was using its dominant 
position to restrict entry into the various wharf 
activities such as stevedoring. 
The Court found that Port Nelson was a natural 
monopoly, isolated as it is from other competing 
facilities. This made it dominant in all the 
relevant markets. In mandating use of its own 
equipment it was not acting as it would in a normal 
competitive environment but was using its dominant 
position to eliminate the use of plant belonging to 
others. This was a contravention of section 36 in 
that it prevented or deterred the competitive 
activity of the plaintiffs. 
20 Above n7. 
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The Glaxo case21 
The applicant manufacturer of the drug Ceporex 
brought an action against the Minister of Health for 
her failure to respond positively to the application 
of the company to have Ceporex given a full listing 
on the Drugs Tariff. The effect of a full listing is 
to qualify Ceporex for public subsidies when 
generally prescribed. At the time of application 
Ceporex qualified for public subsidy only when 
prescribed through a hospital pharmacy. The company 
alleged that since the Minister had the power to 
determine subsidies, she was in a dominant position 
in the market for general prescription antibiotics, 
and her action was for a proscribed purpose. The 
judge found that the Minister did not engage in 
trade, and was therefore exempted from section 36 by 
section 5 of the Act. In addition the Minister's 
actions were specifically authorised by statute and 
consequently exempt under section 43. The judge 
chose not to consider the dominant position point 
under section 36. 
The cases cover a wide range of different fact 
situations. Common to all is an accusation by a less 
powerful organisation that a powerful concern is 
acting in such a way as to adversely affect the 
introduction or ongoing development of competition in 
a market. The long title of the Act is: 
An Act to promote competition in markets within New 
Zealand and to repeal the Commerce Act 1975. 
21 Above n6. 
20 
"Competition" is therefore a crucial concept. It is 
defined in section 3 as "workable or effective 
competition", indicating that a practical approach is 
to be taken in assessing the state of competition in 
a particular case. The two interrelated elements of 
competition are dominance and delineation of market. 
In most cases the courts have taken the view that 
"market" is be defined before the issue of dominance 
is considered, and the same approach is to be taken 
in this paper. 
PART IV: MARKET22 
The factual definition of market is critical to a 
section 36 analysis in that the existence or 
otherwise of dominance is dependent on the definition 
of market boundaries. At one extreme each firm is a 
monopolist of its own product; at the other all 
products of firms compete in the market for the 
consumer's dollar. Naturally a wide definition is in 
the interests of the defendant, and accordingly in 
Magic Millions Wrightson submitted the relevant 
market was the provision of services for the sale of 
thoroughbred horses by whatever means. Magic 
Millions argued the relevant market was either sales 
of thoroughbred horses by auction, or more narrowly, 
sales of thoroughbred yearlings by auction. In 
Festival Records the viewpoints of the opposing 
parties were for the defendant the New Zealand album 
market as a whole, versus for the plaintiff a 
separate and unique market for each album which gets 
22 There are extensive issues surrounding the 
concept of "market" which are outside the scope of 
this paper. Therefore its treatment here will be 
more in the nature of a summary. 
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on to the charts. This pattern, whereby the 
defendant argues for a wide definition and the 
plaintiff for a narrow one, is a common theme running 
through the cases, with the arguments of each side 
often supported by experts in economic theory. 
Section 3(1) of the Act, now amended by the Commerce 
Amendment Act 1990, contained the following 
definition of "market": 
"Market", means a market for goods or services within 
New Zealand that may be distinguished as a matter of 
fact and commercial common sense. 
The accepted criteria for market definition are based 
on the three dimensions of the market, the product 
dimension, the functional level and the geographic 
dimension. Factors to be considered include those in 
section 3(8), which indicate regard is to be had to 
factors affecting both the structure of the market 
(section 3(8) (a)) and the behaviour of those engaged 
in the market (section 3 (8) (b) and (c)). The 
Commerce Commission in News Ltd23 provided an 
expanded list of factors: 24 
(i) The structure of the market, which 
requires a consideration of: 
(a) The share of the market of the merged 
new concern. 
(b) The degree of market concentration. 
(c) The size distribution of all concerns 
in the market. 
(d) The extent to which the products in 
question are characterised by product 
differentiation and sale promotion, ie 
whether there are reasonably close 
substitutes. 
(e) Access to technical knowledge, 
materials and capital. 
(f) The financial stability of the merged 
concern in relation to other operators in 
the market. 
(g) The nature of any formal, stable and 
fundamental contracts, arrangements or 
23 Re Proposal by News Ltd (1986) 6 NZAR 47. 
24 Above n23, 51. 
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understandings between concerns in the 
market. 
(h) The extent of corporate integration 
(eg interlocking shareholdings and cross-
directorships) among concerns in the 
market. 
(i) The extent of vertical integration. 
(ii) The extent of restraints imposed by 
the conduct of competitors or potential 
competitors or by others affected, which 
requires a consideration of: 
(a) The extent to which competition exists 
or has existed and is likely to continue. 
(b) The extent to which the concern is 
constrained by the conduct of competitors. 
(c) The capacity of the concern to 
determine prices in or to exclude entry to 
the market without being inhibited in that 
determination or action by suppliers and 
acquirers. 
(d) The height of barriers to entry in 
that market and the ability of potential 
competitors to enter the market and to 
sustain a position in the market. 
The Commerce Amendment Act 1990 amends section 3(1) 
to read: 25 
(lA) Every reference in this Act, except the 
reference in section 36A(l) (b) and (c) of this Act, 
to the term "market" is a reference to a market in 
New Zealand for goods and services as well as other 
goods or services that, as a matter of fact and 
commercial common sense, are substitutable for them. 
The two significant changes are that the word 
"within" replaces "in" and that the definition now 
specifically incorporates the concept of 
substitutability. Several cases have emphasised 
that the Australian Act incorporated substitutability 
but the New Zealand Act did not, therefore a 
different approach was required in New Zealand. In 
Festival Records Richardson J said: 26 
In focussing in the definition in s3(1) on 
distinguishability as a matter of fact and 
commercial commonsense the legislation has 
25 Commerce Amendment Act 1990 s3(1). 
26 Above n7, 103,292. 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTOl1IA u ~:iVER:i lTY OF WELLINGTON 
23 
carefully avoided giving prominence to any 
particular criterion. In particular, the 
test is not substitutability as such, 
although that will ordinarily be an 
important consideration; and, as is 
recognised in the passage cited, "market" 
is ordinarily regarded as a multi-
dimensional concept with dimensions of 
product, functional level, space and time. 
In Magic Millions Tipping J emphasised the 
differences between the two Acts and said: 27 
our definition emphasises the idea of a 
market being distinguished as a matter of 
fact and commercial commonsense .... While 
I acknowledge that questions of 
substitutability are certainly relevant in 
delineating a market in New Zealand, they 
are by no means the be all and the end all 
of the exercise and care must be taken not 
to give too much weight to that or any 
other aspect. It is a matter of weighing 
all the relevant considerations and then, 
against our statutory definition, 
distinguishing the relevant market as a 
matter of fact and commercial commonsense. 
Matters pertaining to economics and 
economic theory are relevant but must be 
kept in perspective in the light of the 
direction to the courts inherent in the 
definition. 
The amendment has brought the New Zealand definition 
more in line with that of Australia. Although there 
was some focus on substitutability in the cases the 
amendment is likely to change the approach to market 
definition quite substantially by indicating that 
Parliament intends a viewpoint more in line with that 
of economists to be taken. The overall constraint of 
"fact and commercial common sense" will remain. 
The second issue raised by the amendment relates to 
the question of how much influence competition from 
other countries has on market dominance in New 
Zealand. In Magic Millions Wrightsons argued that it 
27 Above n7, 101,514. 
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was not dominant in the New Zealand market since New 
Zealand breeders were free to sell in auctions held 
in Australia. The relevant market should, they 
argued, include New Zealand and the east coast of 
Australia. Tipping J used section 3(1) which 
confines market to one "within New Zealand" to 
restrict section 3(3) which has a potentially wider 
application. He concluded that "services supplied 
outside New Zealand by persons not resident or not 
carrying on business in New Zealand are irrelevant 
when defining the market within New Zealand or 
assessing dominance within it". 28 His Honour stated 
that not only does this interpretation harmonise 
sections 3(1) and (3) but it is also in accord with 
section 4. 
However, Hill points out that: 29 
[t]here is no economic reason for limiting 
the influence of situations and firms 
outside New Zealand because economically 
and commercially there are no national 
boundaries to competitive influences, if 
there is actual or potential trade between 
national jurisdictions. 
Hill's opinion is that not only is Tipping J's 
interpretation wrong from an economic and commercial 
point of view but also from a legal point of view 
since statutory jurisdictions are incompatible with 
market definition. Residency requirements are only 
relevant to the determination of liability and should 
have nothing to do with market definition. The 
change of wording in the amendment from "within New 
Zealand" to "in New Zealand" may have been intended 
to deal with this problem, but its effectiveness is 
doubtful given the weight of precedent. 
28 Above n7, 101,526. 
29 B M Hill "A review of developments under section 
36 of the Commerce Act 1986" Paper presented to the 
August 1990 Workshop of the Competition Law and 
Policy Institute of New Zealand, 36-37. 
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The above discussion relates to how the market is 
defined and the recent changes that have been made. 
Till the Port Nelson case, the generally accepted 
approach was to define the market, then determine if 
dominance existed. In Port Nelson, however, the 
approach to market definition and dominance is not as 
straightforward, with the Court concluding that 
because actual dominance in the relevant market is 
not necessary, the issue of market definition is less 
acute. 
The generally accepted approach is that of Tipping J 
in Magic Millions where, following the Court of 
Appeal in Festival Records, he said: 30 
... although questions of dominance and 
delineation of the market are closely 
related, it has been found helpful in the 
past, for ease of analysis, to define the 
market before turning to the question as to 
whether or not the party concerned has a 
dominant position in that market. 
Tipping J identified the market as "that comprising 
the facilitation of the sale of thoroughbred 
yearlings by auction". 31 He then went on to ask: 32 
..• whether the Plaintiffs have proved on 
the balance of probabilities that 
Wrightsons was in March 1989 in a position 
to exercise a dominant influence over the 
supply of auction services in New Zealand 
for the sale of thoroughbred yearlings. 
He found that they were. The process he followed was 
to identify the market, then establish whether 
Wrightsons was dominant in that market. 
30 Above n7, 101,515. 
31 Above n7, 101,521. 
32 Above n7, 101,525. 
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A different approach was taken in Port Nelson. 
McGechan J and lay member Mr G Blunt referred to 
Festival Records, Magic Millions and Queensland 
Wire 33 and said, referring to the judgment in 
Queensland Wire: 34 
Identification of boundaries of the 
relevant market and identification of 
market power (ie dominance) are part of one 
process (582 per Mason CJ and Wilson J). 
Indeed, the learned Chief Justice and 
Wilson J applied that thought in a vertical 
integration context to reach a view that 
relevant market will be at the level which 
is the source of market power (582). In 
like but more emphatic manner, it was said 
by Deane J (587), with whom Dawson J (590) 
agreed, that "there will ordinarily be 
little point in attempting to define 
relevant markets without first identifying 
precisely what it is that is said to have 
been done in contravention of the section". 
Indeed, for s36 purposes, definition of a 
market is an avoidable problem where the 
defendant has such power that dominance 
will exist however widely the boundaries 
are drawn: Deane J 589; Dawson J 592. 
Deane J resisted attempts at precise 
definition. After reference to the 
Australian s4E, His Honour observed (588) 
"the Act does not otherwise seek to define 
what is meant by the word 'market'. That 
is not surprising since the word is not 
susceptible of precise comprehensive 
definition when used as abstract noun in an 
economic context. The most that can be 
said is that 'market' should, in the 
context of the act, be understood in the 
sense of an area of potentially close 
competition in particular goods and or 
services and other substitutes ... ". 
Dawson J (590) took a comparably general 
approach, specifically warning against 
rigid approaches as leading to unrealistic 
results. 
33 Queensland Wire Industries (1988) ATPR 40-925. 
34 Above n7, 101,641. 
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The Court concluded that the correct approach is 
to: 35 
•.. apply fact and commercial commonsense 
in each case, with the comfort of knowing 
exact delineation may well not be necessary 
if the extent of dominance or contravening 
activity is sufficiently wide. 
To the extent that the Court did define the market, 
it preferred the plaintiff's argument that 
stevedoring was the relevant market because as it 
said, the demarcation between different activity 
fields, although perhaps disintegrating, in fact 
still existed. The defendant had argued a unified 
market for all wharf activities arising from 
economies of scale, an argument which had its 
attractions, but perhaps did not actually exist at 
that time. The Court said, however, that: 36 
... in the present s36 context, the choice 
may not be necessary. A use of dominance 
in a market may take place in relation to a 
significant section of that market. There 
is no doubt that stevedoring services 
comprise a significant segment of Dr 
Williams expanded market. We will proceed 
on the basis of a Nelson "stevedoring 
services" market, or at least on a 
significant section so identified of a 
wider overall market. 
The Court referred to the customary approach of 
defining the market first then evaluating dominance, 
but rejected this as unreal separation of issues. It 
said: 37 
Actual dominance is not necessary. Under 
s3(8) it is sufficient if a firm is "in a 
position to exercise a dominant influence 
over the production, acquisition, supply or 
price of goods or services in that market", 
with regard paid to specified criteria for 
35 Above n7, 101,641. 
36 Above n7, 101,642. 
37 Above n7, 101,643. 
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the purposes of determining whether a 
person is "in a position" ...• A firm with 
dominance in one market may, as a result, 
be "in a position" to be dominant in 
another. That possibility is recognised by 
the legislation in its reference in 
s36(1} (a) (b) and (c) to "any other market". 
The Court concluded that it preferred the definition 
of market as the stevedoring market in the Port 
Nelson area, but that there was no need for choice 
among the options because: 38 
... ownership and control of the wharf 
facilities, on a monopoly basis, is a key 
which permits control of activities 
dependant upon the wharf. 
ARA provides another example of a situation in which 
dominance was found in a market in which the 
defendant could not have been dominant. Budget 
argued that two markets were at issue. ARA was in a 
dominant position in the market of concessions for 
rental car operators at Auckland Airport and that 
they were using their dominant position for the 
purpose of restricting the entry of Budget into that 
market, or any other market. "Any other market" 
Budget argued was a reference to the market for 
hiring of rental cars at Auckland Airport. Barker J 
referred to the section 3(8) definition of dominance 
in a market and found it "difficult to see how ARA is 
other than in a dominant position in both markets 11 • 39 
ARA held a monopoly, for which no substitutes were 
available. Thus ARA was found dominant in both the 
market for providing concessions and the market for 
hiring of rental cars. However, ARA could not have 
been dominant in the market for hiring rental cars, 
and the test from section 3(8) would not have 
permitted liability to be found. In the context of 
that particular case, though, ARA was clearly 
38 Above n7, 101,645. 
39 Above n7, 678. 
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dominant in the market for the supply of concessions, 
so whether it could or should have been found 
dominant in the other market was not, in the end, 
significant. Having been found dominant in the 
market for concessions it was then using its 
influence in another market for proscribed purposes, 
within the terms of section 36. 
By contrast in Festival Records and Magic Millions 
the first step was to delineate the market, then 
apply the tests for dominance and purpose to that 
particular market. The advantages of this approach 
according to Maureen Brunt40 are that the market 
concept serves to define what is relevant and why. 
It is an aid to clear thinking about economic 
relationships and causality. It is also very helpful 
to a legal analysis which must apply rules to the 
facts of a case. The danger of the approach in Port 
Nelson is that the court did not clearly define the 
market and then apply the section 3(8) factors to 
determine whether dominance existed. Dominance was 
established but not in the relevant market, yet a 
breach of section 36 was found. 41 
The approach of the Court in Port Nelson might 
reflect the emphasis it placed on the statutory 
object of the Act at the outset of its analysis. It 
stated that the emphasis was to permit competition 
and that the particular objectives of sections 27 and 
36 were to be seen within this overall objective. 
Port Nelson's actions were inhibiting competitive 
activity in the provision of stevedoring services on 
the wharves, and clearly they held a dominant 
position. This raises the question whether the 
general objectives of the Act are at risk of not 
being met in the application of the particular 
40 Above n3, 113. 
41 Further discussion of the result in Port Nelson 
is included under Part V: Dominance. 
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sections of it. The Court could, however, have 
accepted the argument that the market consisted of 
the wider provision of port facilities. It could 
then have found dominance in this market, used to 
influence the stevedoring market. It is not clear 
why the Court chose to take the path it did. 
It is interesting to compare the method described in 
the US Department of Justice Guidelines for defining 
the market. The definition is used to enable an 
inference to be made as to the existence of market 
power, as it is in New Zealand. Market definition 
relies heavily on market share on the basis that an 
organisation with sufficient market share is free to 
act uncompetitively where its competitors are too 
small to take advantage of the opportunity. 
The process is in two steps. First the firm is 
assumed to be the only producer in the area. Then 
the effect of a hypothetical moderate price rise (5-
10%) is examined to establish whether the resulting 
profitability would be sustainable. Four relevant 
factors to be considered are demand side 
substitution, supply side substitution, geographic 
substitution, and new entry. The information that is 
collected may indicate that consumers will substitute 
quite dissimilar products, or suppliers of dissimilar 
goods will re-tool to compete. These alternative or 
additional products are to be included in the market, 
reducing market share and thus the possibility of 
finding market power. Similarly ease of substitution 
by consumers of goods from other geographical 
locations may indicate the area as drawn is too 
narrow. Finally, if other suppliers would be induced 
to enter the market within a reasonable time they are 
also included. With the addition by amendment of 
substitutability as a key consideration for a section 
36 analysis, the process of market definition in New 
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Zealand is brought more into line with that in the 
us. 
The value of this approach according to Hay42 is that 
it addresses the problem of defining a market 
according to a retrospective assessment of market 
share by introducing a dynamic forward-looking 
perspective much more in line with reality. In 
addition this is a valuable way of organising the 
data and enabling a practically oriented approach by 
investigative staff for whom a highly relevant 
question is "what if ... ". The views of business-
persons take on added significance and may often be 
the most useful data. This aspect of the analysis is 
compatible with the New Zealand emphasis on fact and 
commercial common sense. 
A result of this type of analysis is the counter-
intuitive possibility that a firm which is the only 
supplier of a product may not be found to have market 
power. An example of this might be where a port 
company puts up its port handling charges, thereby 
increasing the price of all commodities brought in 
through that port. If consumers of those goods are 
thereby induced to buy from other sources, the price 
rise will not be sustainable over the long term and 
the port does not have real market power. Similarly 
a manufacturer which is a monopolist of follow-up 
servicing of its product may, by charging high 
servicing costs, cause buyers to turn to other 
cheaper products. Although it may have a monopoly of 
the market for servicing its own product, it does not 
have the market power necessary to allow it to raise 
prices. The point is relevant in New Zealand since 
there may be a tendency to assume that where there is 
42 G Hay "Market Dominance" Paper presented to the 
August 1990 Workshop of the Competition Law and 
Policy Institute of New Zealand. 
32 
a monopoly there is automatic market power, when in 
fact, further analysis would indicate there is not. 
In Port Nelson the Court said that the separation of 
"market" from "dominance" is unreal, and that the two 
concepts were mutually interdependent and had to be 
dealt with together. It is true that from an 
economic perspective the concept of market dominance 
is a total concept. The problem is that where 
liability rests on a finding of misuse of market 
dominance, it must be clear from a practical point of 
view what the meaning of the term is so that firms 
may act accordingly. Hence the value of the step by 
step approach that is taken in most of the cases, and 
in this paper. Thus, once the market has been 
defined, the next step is to evaluate dominance. 
PART V: DOMINANCE 
The statutory approach to the determination of 
dominance is to apply the factors in section 3(8). 
If the circumstances of the firm do not conform to 
the tests in section 3(8) then dominance for the 
purposes of the Act does not exist. The Chatham 
Islands case provides a simple example. 
Eichelbaum J commenced by defining the market as the 
services required by fishers for purposes of their 
trade, including access to wharf facilities, in the 
geographical area of Kaingaroa. His Honour then 
applied section 3(8) to establish whether there was 
dominance. Under section 3(8) (a) the share of the 
market of the defendants, their technical knowledge, 
and access to materials and capital overshadowed 
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everything else available. The share of the wharf 
was total. Under (b), the defendants were not 
constrained in any way by competitors, nor under (c) 
did the actions of suppliers affect them. The 
defendants argued the plaintiff could get supplies 
elsewhere on the island and could use dinghies to 
circumvent the wharf. Eichelbaum J found these 
alternatives not to be real constraints of the 
defendants and that the defendants were"··· in a 
position to exercise a dominant influence over the 
.•. supply ... of ... goods or services1143 in the 
market. 
A similar approach is taken in Magic Millions where, 
having defined the market as that comprising the 
facilitation of the sale of thoroughbred yearlings by 
auction, Tipping J considered the question of 
dominance in that market. He endorsed the approach 
of Davison CJ in the Lion Corp44 case. In that case 
Lion had sought judicial review of the Commerce 
Commission's decision to permit Magnum to merge with 
Dominion Breweries, on the basis that the Commission, 
in interpreting section 3(8), gave inadequate weight 
to section 3(8) (a) structural factors while 
overemphasising sections 3(8) (b) and (c), the 
behavioural factors. Lion had argued that the 
Brierley group acquired market shares that were very 
high in many markets and that to downplay these" 
not only ignores the explicit provisions of s3(8) (a) 
but also ignores the universal recognition of the 
vital significance of high market shares as an 
indicator of dominance 11 . 45 
43 Section 3(8). 
44 Lion Corporation Ltd v Commerce Commission [1987] 
2 NZLR 682. 
45 Above n44, 687. 
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The Chief Justice however rejected Lion's argument 
pointing out that the Commission had to give meaning 
to the word "dominant". It: 46 
... adopted the so-called "independence of 
behaviour test" as equating to "dominance" 
so that where throughout its decision it 
referred to "independence of behaviour" it 
was in fact referring to "dominance". It 
also included the para (a) requirements as 
is apparent from that part of the decision 
just referred to when it spoke of a person 
in a "dominant position" having sufficient 
market power (economic strength]. Market 
power and economic strength are matters 
referred to in para (a) which speaks of the 
share of the market, technical knowledge, 
access to materials or capital. 
The Chief Justice endorsed this approach of the 
Commerce Commission, and the same approach was taken 
by Tipping Jin Magic Millions. Market share, ie 
factor (a), is not the sole determinant of dominance 
but dominance is frequently found in conjunction with 
a high market share. This must be accompanied by a 
consideration of the other relevant factors in 
section 3(8). 
Within the market identified by Tipping J of sales by 
auction of thoroughbred yearlings, comprising sub-
markets Kl and K2, it was not immediately clear to 
the Court whether Wrightsons had a dominant position, 
since Magic Millions was in fact in the market. It 
was clear that Wrightsons was dominant in the Kl sub-
market. His Honour said "[t]here cannot I think on 
the evidence be any doubt about that proposition11 • 47 
On his analysis, however, he had to establish 
Wrightsons' dominance in the K2 sub-market as well, 
in order to establish dominance in the total market. 
This was possible because of Wrightsons' ability to 
46 Above n44, 690. 
47 Above n7, 101,522. 
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tie the two sub-markets together. To test this 
proposition he applied the three factors in 3(8). 
Under 3(a) he found Wrightsons' market share highly 
concentrated by percentage of numbers and value, 
technical knowledge and access to materials and 
capital. Any share that might devolve upon Magic 
Millions was entirely dependent on Wrightsons' sale 
dates not coinciding with those of Magic Millions. 
Under 3(8) (b) the fact that Wrightsons was able to 
move its sales dates at will and without consultation 
indicated lack of any constraint arising from the 
presence of Magic Millions. Likewise Wrightsons' 
concern to ensure the Kl and K2 sales were tied 
together overrode any consideration of the 
preferences of the Breeders' Association. 
As far as potential competitors were concerned 
Tipping J found that "without barriers to entry 
dominance will seldom if ever be found 1148 and that 
their height was critical. Potential competition is 
one of the most important factors to be defined in 
assessing dominance. Thus a consideration of 
barriers to entry is critical since it is the ease 
with which firms can enter the market that determines 
the level of potential competition. A barrier to 
entry is any factor which raises the costs to a 
potential entrant above those of incumbent firms, or 
which otherwise restricts or discourages new firms 
from entering the market. For instance, existing 
firms may have cost advantages arising from patented 
technology or trained staff, or they may have 
advantages of large scale production and financial 
resources. Other factors include customer loyalty, 
and government policies such as tariffs and import 
licences which act to raise the prices of competing 
48 Above n7, 101,524. 
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imported goods. Labour laws can act as barriers to 
entry if for instance there will be redundancy costs 
on exiting a market. In Re Queensland Co-operative 
Milling Association Ltd49 the Australian Trade 
Practices Tribunal said, after describing the 
elements of market structure: 50 
Of all these elements of market structure, 
no doubt the most important is (2), the 
condition of entry. For it is the ease 
with which firms may enter which 
establishes the possibilities of market 
concentration over time; and it is the 
threat of the entry of a new firm or a new 
plant into a market which operates as the 
ultimate regulator of competitive conduct. 
Tipping J's approach to barriers to entry is patently 
legalistic rather than economic. He found Wrightsons 
had considerable sunk costs in expertise, facilities 
and client base. A potential competitor would know 
from Wrightsons' conduct in 1988 that a battle was 
likely to ensue. Wrightsons pointed out that Magic 
Millions' relatively small investment indicated 
barriers were low but the judge found that questions 
of barriers to entry should be determined by 
reference to the market as a whole, rather than a 
particular party. 
Under 3(8) (c) Wrightsons argued it was severely 
constrained by the actions of breeders who were able 
to send horses to Australia if they wished. The 
evidence, however, suggested the breeders were not 
troubled by the manipulation of dates. 
Tipping J concluded that on the factors in section 
3(8), Wrightsons was in a dominant position in the 
market. The important factors were: 51 
49 (1976) 8 ALR 481. 
50 Above n49, 516. 
51 Above n7, 101,525-101,526. 
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[fi]rst, Wrightsons' firmly established 
position in the market, effectively for 60 
years; second, its undoubted stranglehold 
on the A sector of the market; third, its 
ability to act in a manner largely 
unconstrained when setting dates; fourth, 
its ability to link Kl and K2 to suit its 
purposes in the face of an emerging 
competitor; fifth, Magic Millions' very 
fragile position aside, the absence of any 
workable or effective competition for 
Wrightsons within the market; and sixth, 
the problems provided by the limit in the 
number of available time slots. This in my 
view is a relevant and significant barrier 
to entry into the market. It is also, I 
agree, an aspect of product differentiation 
but not to the extent of justifying 
Wrightsons' conduct. 
By contrast with the approach taken in Magic 
Millions, Festival Records, and the other cases, in 
Port Nelson section 3(8} is read to mean that "actual 
dominance is not necessary1152 , and that it is 
sufficient that a firm is "in a position to exercise 
a dominant influence ... in that market 11 • 53 The 
section 3(8} factors have little prominence. Having 
already determined that Port Nelson held a monopoly 
of port activities and had overall dominance, and 
that the relevant market was for stevedoring 
services, it was axiomatic that Port Nelson was 
dominant in the stevedoring market. 
The Port Nelson approach, therefore, is that a firm 
had only to be in a position to exercise a dominant 
influence, rather than actually be dominant in the 
market. The question that is raised is how one can 
find a breach of section 36 if dominance in the 
market is not found. If the relevant market was for 
stevedoring services, then Port Nelson was not 
dominant, yet the Court found a breach of section 36. 
The Court cited both sections 36 and 3(8) in support 
of its view, however section 36 states that dominance 
52 Above n7, 101,643. 
53 Section 3(8}. 
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in a market must be established, and section 3(8) 
provides the criteria for establishing whether that 
dominance exists. Where section 3(8) refers to a 
firm being "in a position to exercise a dominant 
influence .•. in a market", this indicates that such 
a firm is included in the definition of a dominant 
firm for purposes of section 36. Once dominance has 
been found, then in accordance with section 36, the 
acts of the firm in either that or some other market 
come under scrutiny. 
Once the questions of relevant market and dominance 
have been established, the next question that is 
raised is whether there is a "use" test or whether 
one goes straight to a consideration of purpose. The 
issue is a critical one, since if there is a use test 
the ambit of the section will include fewer acts of 
dominant firms, whereas if the next step to be 
considered is purpose, all acts of dominant firms 
will be subject, and consequently the likelihood of 
more being found in breach is high. 
PART VI: USE 
A major issue in the interpretation of section 36 is 
whether it includes a "use" test as an issue standing 
separately from a consideration of purpose. The 
cases are ambivalent on this point. Most do not 
provide any real guidance. Others like Port Nelson 
and ARA assume there is an issue of use and state 
that the defendants did in fact use their dominance. 
The facts of the two cases facilitate this argument, 
possibly because in each case the organisation's 
monopoly power enabled the action. In Magic Millions 
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Tipping J considered Wrightsons' argument that it did 
not use its position and rejected the possibility, 
but without extensive analysis. 
The argument for a use test is founded on the idea of 
discretion. The essence of market power is that a 
firm has the power to exercise discretion. In other 
words a dominant firm can choose whether to exercise 
its market power. For instance, Port Nelson did not 
have to impose a requirement that only equipment 
belonging to it could be used on the wharfs. It made 
a choice which, in the absence of dominance, would 
have been unavailable to it, in the sense that if 
there had been competing port facilities users could 
have gone elsewhere. Similarly, ARA held by statute 
a dominant position in the market for rental car 
concessions at Auckland Airport, and it had 
discretionary power as to whether to allow another 
entrant. 
If having discretion means a firm can choose whether 
or not to take some action that, but for the dominant 
position, would have been unavailable to it, this 
suggests that there are many acts of dominant firms 
which do not involve use of the dominant position. 
Wrightsons argued that normal competitive activity 
did not involve use of dominance. It follows that if 
some actions constitute use and others not, a 
dominant firm's actions may be classified as non-use, 
use, and misuse. Non-use involves competitive acts 
which do not depend on the dominant position. These 
are not caught by section 36 and a purpose enquiry is 
therefore not relevant. Use constitutes competitive 
acts which depend on the firm's dominance in the 
relevant market. These are caught by section 36 and 
a purpose test is then applied. Misuse includes 
those acts which depend on the firm being dominant in 
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the relevant market and which are found to have one 
of the proscribed purposes. 
The point that is being made is that if use of 
dominance is found, this falls into the words of the 
section, and whether it constitutes misuse is then 
determined under the purpose test. However non-use 
does not fall into the section and is eliminated from 
consideration on this basis. In Magic Millions 
Tipping J referred to the judgment of Mason CJ and 
Wilson Jin Queensland Wire 54 where they pointed out 
that the purpose provisions defined use and misuse, 
and he used that as a basis for his rejection of the 
argument on use. However, the above analysis argues 
that use as opposed to misuse is still determined by 
the purpose enquiry and therefore meets His Honour's 
concerns as well as those of the judges in Queensland 
Wire. The issue to be considered in the use test is 
the boundary between use and non-use. The two cases 
in which the point is most clearly made are Fisher 
and Paykel and Port Nelson. 
In Fisher and Paykel Barker J did not, having 
established dominance, go straight into a 
consideration of purpose. He found it necessary to 
establish the means by which the goal was reached, 
which was by limiting the number of rental car 
concessionaires. He said: 55 
Although ARA's motive may have been to 
maximise rent, by accepting only two rental 
car operators, its means of achieving this 
object was the use of its dominant position 
to exclude competitors of the successful 
concessionaires. The collateral contract 
therefore had the purpose of excluding 
other potential concessionaires. 
54 Above n33. 
55 Above n6, 680. 
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Barker J's analysis suggests that even if ARA had had 
an anticompetitive motive, it was crucial for section 
36 that ARA should be found to have used its dominant 
position as the means of achieving its purpose. If 
there was no use of the dominant position, by 
implication section 36 would not apply irrespective 
of purpose. 
In Port Nelson the Court said: 56 
Section 36 provides that no person, who has 
a dominant position in a market "shall use 
that position" for proscribed purposes. 
There must be "use" of dominant position 
for infringement. The section does not say 
that no person who has a dominant position 
in a market shall "act" for proscribed 
purposes. The evidence of Dr Williams and 
the submissions for PNL took the stance 
that there is no "use" of dominant position 
where a person is simply doing something 
that would be done in a competitive 
situation in any event. Put so baldly, and 
as a theoretical proposition, few would 
disagree. If a person simply acts in a 
normal competitive fashion, as he would 
whether dominant or not, that person hardly 
can be said to be "using dominance". 
The question, the Court said, is one of fact.
57 Port 
Nelson was not in fact acting as it would in a 
competitive situation but: 58 
[i]ts present demands are possible 
because of its dominant position. 
demands, at times stark, are a use 
dominance. 
only 
Its 
of that 
Magic Millions represents the only considered 
statement of the argument against a use test. Others 
have either ignored the issue, or left the reader to 
infer what the position is. For instance, Eichelbaum 
J, in the Chatham Islands case, went from 
56 Above n7, 101,645. 
57 Above n7, 101,645. 
58 Above n7, 101,646. 
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establishing dominance directly into a purpose test, 
but he said: 59 
... the plaintiff alleges that as the holders of 
a dominant position in the market, the 
defendants have used their position for the 
purpose of restricting the entry of any person 
into another market, namely the market for the 
obtaining and processing of the catch of fish 
landed at Kaingaroa. Having regard to the terms 
of S 2(5) it is unnecessary for the purpose to 
be the sole purpose. 
It is not clear from the reasoning whether Eichelbaum 
J would have thought the issue of "use" was a 
separate question or not. The defendant could not 
have acted as they did if they had not owned the 
facilities, and therefore use was established without 
further consideration. 
Another case in which only hints were made is Apple 
Fields. Holland J, after agreeing that the Board had 
a dominant position in the apple wholesale market, 
went on to say: 60 
It is significant that it is the use of the 
position for the purpose which must be 
considered. 
As in the Chatham Islands case, it is hard to 
determine whether the fact that dominance was hardly 
an issue meant use of the position was not an issue 
either. It is easier to argue that the close 
connection with purpose suggests a Magic Millions 
approach in which the purpose test is the final 
determinant of liability if a firm is found dominant. 
In Magic Millions, representing the other side of the 
argument, Wrightsons argued that if it were found 
dominant, its conduct in changing dates did not 
constitute use of its position but was consistent 
59 Above n6, 12. 
60 Above n7, 103,581. 
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with normal competitive behaviour. Tipping J 
observed that he: 61 
would have thought that if a person 
having a dominant position acts in a 
particular way with a prohibited purpose in 
mind it is almost axiomatic that such a 
person has used his (sic) dominant position 
for a prohibited purpose 
Tipping J remarked further that: 62 
[i]t seems to me that the key question is 
not so much whether a dominant party has 
used its dominant position but rather 
whether or not its conduct is proved to 
have been for one or more of the proscribed 
purposes ... if someone with a dominant 
position takes some action for a purpose 
proscribed by section 36 then clearly they 
are using their dominant position in a 
manner which section 36 prohibits. 
This indicates that Tipping J thinks all acts of 
dominant firms must be subject to a section 36 
analysis, and all are at risk of being found to have 
a proscribed purpose. 
Might the outcome of the case have been different if 
Tipping J had analysed Wrightsons' actions in terms 
of a use test? The question to ask, from Port 
Nelson, would be whether Wrightsons' actions depended 
on its dominant position. In a competitive 
environment one might expect to find several 
competing auctions run by firms with varying market 
shares. It is reasonable to suppose that in such a 
situation Wrightsons might have been constrained by 
its fear that clients would choose the rival auction 
of a powerful competitor if they were forced to make 
a choice. Wrightsons' perception of the risk of loss 
of clientele would be likely to lead it to avoid 
clashes with potent rivals. Possibly the same would 
61 Above n7, 101,528. 
62 Above n7, 101,528. 
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not hold true for its smaller rivals. An ordinary 
sales strategy of firms in competition is to try to 
attract away a rival's clientele by providing 
consumers with a choice. Large organisations like 
supermarkets should not have to be concerned about 
opening during the same hours as the corner store, 
although the purpose of the longer hours is to woo 
the customers of the corner store. Even if one can 
argue that Magic Millions is different, in that 
Wrightsons' persistence in changing the dates to 
maintain a situation of clashing dates was 
reprehensible, does the Act forbid reprehensible 
competitive activity? 
Wrightsons' acts indicated its focus was its 
competitor and its purpose was to knock that 
competitor out of the market. If one considers that 
liability under the section relates to purpose, 
Wrightsons is liable. But if one supports a use 
test, it is arguable that Wrightsons may not have 
been liable, and the purpose of the actions would 
never have been in issue. Subjectively speaking, it 
is hard to permit acts that seem reprehensible to 
escape, but as in criminal law, the tests are 
objective although one may not like the results. 
In the above analysis the test for use was whether 
the firm could have acted as it did in the absence of 
dominance . In his article63 , Hill states that the 
relevant question to be asked is: 64 
Is the conduct and the response to it 
consistent with normal single firm 
competitive behaviour? 
It should be noted that there is some danger in 
justifying acts by likening them to those of non-
63 Above n29. 
64 Above n29, 19. 
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dominant firms. Firms not in a dominant position are 
free to act in ways that dominant firms cannot. It 
is the dominant firm that is in a position to inhibit 
competition. Although the acts might be exactly the 
same, a non-dominant firm cannot perform "anti-
competitive activity" the way it is understood in the 
context of competition law. The acts of a non-
dominant firm are aggressive, not anti-competitive. 
The issues are clarified if one concentrates on 
whether the actions could have occurred in the 
absence of dominance. In Magic Millions the answer 
is yes, whereas in Port Nelson and ARA the answer is 
clearly no. 
The effect of a use test would be to alter the focus 
of the section away from the purpose test and onto 
the use test. Whether this is likely, not to mention 
feasible or desirable, depends on how the purpose 
test operates in practice. It is now proposed to 
examine the purpose test, then go on to look at how 
the two tests might interact. 
PART VII: PURPOSE 
To contravene section 36, a dominant firm must have 
the purpose of restricting another trader from 
entering a market, whether it be the market in which 
dominance was found or another market, or preventing 
or deterring competitive conduct in either market, or 
eliminating any person from either market. The 
intention is to disallow these anti-competitive acts 
by dominant firms, but to allow normal competitive 
activity. The tests do not look at the effect of the 
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activity, but focus on the motive of the dominant 
firm. 
Section 2(5) (b) provides that: 
(b) A person shall be deemed to have engaged, or to 
engage, in conduct for a particular purpose or a 
particular reason if -
(i) That person engaged or engages in that conduct 
for that purpose or reason or for purposes or reasons 
that included or include that purpose or reason; and 
(ii) That purpose or reason was or is a substantial 
purpose or reason. 
Under section 2(5), therefore, "purpose" is not 
confined to "sole purpose". Multi-purpose conduct 
which includes the anti-competitive purpose is 
sufficient if the anti-competitive purpose is a 
"substantial" purpose. In section 2(1A) 
"substantial" is defined as meaning "real or of 
substance". 
There are three issues that create difficulty for the 
operation of the purpose test. One is the 
controversy caused by the lack of indication in the 
section whether the test is to be subjective or 
objective. The cases have made conflicting 
statements. The second is whether purpose can be 
inferred from the evidence. The position most 
commonly held is that it can. The third issue is the 
intention of the test. The way the words read 
suggest that the purpose is to protect competitors 
from the rigours of competition. There is general 
judicial agreement that this should not be so, and 
that the test is directed towards the protection of 
competition, regardless of the hardships that that 
may cause to a small competitor struggling to 
compete. How the test is applied in practice, 
however, indicates that whatever the professed 
judicial position, the words of the section can 
inhibit the intended outcome. The following 
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discussion describes how the courts have treated the 
test and the issues arising out of it. 
With respect to the objective/subjective debate, in 
ARA the statement of facts recorded that the purpose 
of ARA in granting concessions to Hertz and Avis was 
to maximise profit. The means of achieving the goal 
was the use of the dominant position to exclude 
competitors. Barker J deduced that a purpose of the 
collateral contracts was, therefore, to exclude 
competitors, and that this was a purpose along with 
the purpose of maximising income. This is clearly an 
objective analysis. 
In Festival Records the question was only raised in 
connection with section 27. Both objective and 
subjective tests were found to be satisfied. 
In the High Court judgment of Apple Fields, Holland J 
referred to Barker J's judgment in ARA but weighed it 
against the decision of Toohey Jin the Western 
Australian Cricket case65 in which the subjective 
test was preferred. He pointed out that in Festival 
Records the Court of Appeal found: 66 
... it is not necessary to discuss the 
interpretation of the purpose alternative 
beyond noting that its meaning calls for 
careful analysis of the statutory scheme 
and setting. 
Holland J went on to state, referring to section 36, 
that "at least in this provision the appropriate test 
of 'purpose' is a subjective one". 67 The purpose of 
the Apple and Pear Marketing Board was to recover 
from new entrants or those increasing production a 
fair proportion of the capital costs associated with 
65 Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association 
(Inc) @ Ors (1986) ATPR 40-736. 
66 Above n7, 103,578. 
67 Above n7, 103,581. 
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handling the increased volume of fruit. The Board 
did not have the purpose of restricting entry or 
deterring competition. In the Court of Appeal Cooke 
P, referring to the proscribed purposes and the 
purpose of recovery of capital costs accepted by 
Holland J, said: 68 
The difficulty, as I see it, is that those 
two ways of analysing the Board's purpose 
are not really different. They are not in 
contrast but alternative ways of saying the 
same thing. The Board has set out to 
ensure that newcomers would not be 
attracted to the industry partly by the 
prospect of establishment costs seen by the 
Board as unrealistically low. Similarly 
the Board thought that established growers 
would be less likely to make new plantings 
if faced with a levy. By achieving some 
degree of fairness the levy at the same 
time inevitably carries out a policy or 
purpose of restricting new production. 
Intrinsically it is a policy restraining 
competition seen by the Board and the 
Federation as unfair ... I cannot avoid the 
conclusion that the arrangement for the 
levy between the Board and the Federation, 
however well motivated, has had a 
substantial purpose of deterring entry into 
the apple-growing industry or increases in 
production. 
Cooke P is not saying that there is an additional 
purpose of deterring entry, but that the purpose of 
recovery of capital costs is another way of stating 
the same purpose. Since this was a avowed purpose of 
the Board, Cooke P might be seen to be advocating a 
subjective test, although he did not go on to discuss 
the subjective or objective nature of the test. This 
analysis of Cooke P's view is disagreed with by the 
Court in Port Nelson which thought Cooke P was taking 
an objective approach. 69 
68 Above n7, 103,743. 
69 Above n7, 101,647. 
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In Magic Millions, Tipping J held that: 70 
when one is talking of purpose one is 
really talking about what a party has in 
mind. It is clearly a subjective matter. 
Tipping J did not mention either ARA or Apple Fields. 
Shortly after the Magic Millions decision the Court 
in Port Nelson analysed the New Zealand decisions, 
the Australian decisions and text book authorities 
and said: 71 
We must say we are reluctant to adopt an 
entirely subjective approach. As the 
development of the law of contract rather 
demonstrates, the commercial field is one 
in which objective ascertainment of states 
of mind has much to commend it. We would 
be sorry to see the objectives of s36 
inhibited by any undue subjectivity as to 
purpose, perhaps more natural to criminal 
law. However, in the light of Tipping J's 
firmly expressed view, we will leave the 
question of principle open. In the end, a 
decision is not strictly necessary within 
the context of this present case. In any 
event, often the difference will be more 
apparent than real. Proof of purpose, in 
the nature of these cases often will turn 
upon inferences drawn from actions and 
circumstances, with a sprinkling of 
internal memoranda and correspondence. 
Protestations of inner thoughts which do 
not reconcile with objective likelihoods 
are unlikely to carry much weight. In many 
cases, and this ultimately is one, both 
objective and subjective standards are met. 
The Court found that the wider purpose of Port Nelson 
was to ensure that its own plant was fully utilised, 
but it was also found that a subsidiary purpose was 
to inhibit USS from using its own plant in 
competition with Port Nelson. The wharf user levy 
had a deterrent purpose so far as it exceeded the 
commercially reasonable. These purposes were 
objectively ascertainable but there was existing 
70 Above n7, 101,529. 
71 Above n7, 101,648. 
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subjective evidence if required in the form of 
memoranda between executives of Port Nelson. 
Whether the test is ultimately decided to be 
subjective or objective has implications for the 
ambit of the section. It is harder to produce 
evidence of subjective than objective purpose. Since 
the existence of evidence of subjective purpose seems 
somewhat arbitrary, it is arguably a reason why the 
test should not be subjective. But on the other hand 
objective purpose may be too low a hurdle, especially 
if section 36 liability for dominant firms depends on 
the purpose test. 
Although the question whether the test is subjective 
or objective has not been answered, the ability of 
the court to infer purpose is less controversial. In 
the absence of evidence from the party concerned, 
Tipping Jin Magic Millions made it clear that the 
court may infer purpose from available materials. 
His Honour said: 72 
Unless that party gives evidence, as Mr 
Floyd did, as to its purpose then the Court 
is left to infer with what purpose a person 
acts from all the available and relevant 
materials. 
This statement suggests that in the absence of a 
legitimate purpose for particular conduct the Court 
will infer an anti-competitive purpose. The 
statement follows statements of Barker Jin Fisher 
and Paykel, who was prepared to consider the 
question of purpose based on inferred evidence. 
Barker J said: 73 
It is a reasonable inference, giving rise 
to a serious question to be tried, that a 
substantial reason - not necessarily the 
72 Above n7, 101,529. 
73 Above n6, 102,626. 
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only reason - for the defendant's conduct 
is to enforce its dominant position for one 
of the purposes named in the statute. 
Similarly in ARA Barker J said: 74 
... an agreement to exclude others 
arbitrarily must be taken as having the 
purpose to monopolise. 
In Port Nelson the Court inferred from the evidence 
concerning the wharf user levy that it did not only 
have the purpose of obtaining a return on surface 
areas provided, but also had the purpose of deterring 
USS from using its own plant. The reason was that 
the wharf user levy was higher than commercially 
reasonable. 
The general agreement in New Zealand suggests that 
there is no need to amend the Act as happened in 
Australia. In Australia conflicting statements by 
courts led to amendment of their Act in 1986. 
Section 46(7) now makes it clear that an inference as 
to purpose can be drawn from conduct or other 
circumstances. 
The third issue raised by the purpose test is whether 
in practice it tends towards the protection of 
competitors rather than competition, regardless of 
the statements of the court. In Port Nelson the 
Court, referring to sections 27 and 36, stated 
unequivocally that: 75 
(s)uch provisions are directed at 
protection of the concept of competition as 
such. They are not directed at the 
protection of individual competitors, 
except insofar as the latter may promote 
the former. 
74 Above n7, 680. 
75 Above n7, 101,640. 
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However, the proscribed purposes emphasise the actual 
or potential competitor, rather than harm to the 
competitive process as such. Although prohibition 
of the specified purposes will tend to be consistent 
with the promotion of competition, it is probably not 
wise to assume that this is true all the time. As 
the section is presently worded, and since actions 
may be brought by private individuals or firms, there 
is at least some danger that the section could be 
used by small competitors as a non-market weapon in 
the battle against their larger rivals. The 
statement in the long title to the Act indicates that 
such use of section 36 is against the intention of 
the Act, but the possibility is admitted by the words 
of section 36. 
Whether the legislature intended section 36 liability 
to depend on a use test and/or a purpose test is not 
clear from the words of the section. Although the 
words of the section as interpreted in court are 
determinative in the final analysis, there is some 
value in speculating on what the consequences are for 
one interpretation or the other. 
If, for instance, the purpose test does in fact allow 
dominant firms to engage in normal competitive 
activity, the concern about a use test is a less 
compelling problem to be solved. But the risk with a 
purpose test is that it is possible to argue that all 
competitive activity has one of the proscribed 
purposes long-term. For example, lowering one's 
prices to increase one's market share automatically 
reduces the opportunities of a rival who may be 
unable to compete for a variety of reasons, including 
such things as size, available short-term capital and 
ability to diversify. The rival may even face the 
prospect of going out of business. Under the purpose 
test dominant firms engaging in this type of activity 
53 
are at risk. In the absence of a use test one must 
consider all the uncertainties surrounding the 
purpose test, not only the risk of catching 
competitive activity. Another uncertainty is the 
objective or subjective nature of the test, which 
will affect the extent and type of activities caught 
by it. 
If the court eventually decides there is a use test, 
the purpose test will be much less significant in the 
overall context of section 36 liability. It is 
submitted that a use test is more likely to eliminate 
normal competitive activity than a purpose test. 
Where use of market power is found, as opposed to 
non-use, these activities only will be subject to the 
purpose tests, and presumably not all will be caught. 
The threshold of liability for a dominant firm will 
be shifted more to the use test and away from the 
purpose test. The probable result of this is that 
the ambit of the section is narrower, and fewer acts 
of dominant firms will be caught. 
So far the cases have provided little analysis of a 
use test, which would give some guidance as to how 
such a test might work. As for the purpose test, it 
has been argued here that Magic Millions is an 
example of the purpose test operating to catch normal 
competitive activity that would not have been caught 
by a use test. 
Beyond the uncertainties as to what the tests are in 
section 36 which have been described in the previous 
parts of this paper, there are more general problems 
with section 36 that relate to the situations it is 
expected to control and regulate. 
54 
PART VIII: GENERAL ISSUES RAISED BY S36 
Section 36 is expected to operate in a wide variety 
of roles. It is expected to control the development 
of competition in newly deregulated industries and 
industries which have been subject till recently to 
direct state ownership. Access to essential 
facilities is expected to be guaranteed by section 
36. It is also supposed to be effective in 
controlling dumping on New Zealand markets by 
Australian firms. Concerns have been expressed about 
its effectiveness in achieving these aims. 
For instance, with regard to essential facilities, it 
may be that section 36 is not sufficiently explicit 
to require that access be provided to an essential 
facility, and that the burden of proving a purpose 
behind denial of access is to restrict entry into a 
market is too difficult. In ARA, Barker J adopted 
the dictum of the United states Court of Appeals in 
Hecht76 which stated that foreclosing access to 
essential facilities was an illegal restraint of 
trade unless access was impractical or would inhibit 
the defendant's ability to serve its customers. In 
Port Nelson the Court was more circumspect, listing 
the reasons why the doctrine should not be adopted by 
New Zealand as is. Essential facilities are 
potentially a major problem in New Zealand given our 
large number of natural monopolies. Industry 
specific regulation may be required if section 36 
does not prove effective. 
As part of the CER review in 1988 the anti-dumping 
laws governing trans-Tasman trade have been removed. 
76 Hecht v Pro-Football Inc 570 F 2d 982 (1977), 
992-993. 
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As a result, New Zealand is potentially exposed to 
the predatory use of a dominant position in a trans-
Tasman market which the prior dumping laws were 
intended to handle. The definition of market in the 
Commerce Act 1986 has been widened to include a tran-
Tasman market, but there is fear that the thresholds 
in section 36 may not be adequate to protect New 
Zealand firms against large Australian concerns with 
a much wider resource base. In a trans-Tasman 
context, there are also problems with how section 36 
will interact with section 46 of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974, given the slightly different wording of the 
two sections. 
Other more general difficulties with section 36 are 
that certain actions of firms are omitted from its 
ambit. For instance, section 36 cannot be used to 
control monopoly pricing if the purpose is not anti-
competitive. Another omission is that under the 
price control provisions of the Act one of the 
matters to be observed is the promotion of efficiency 
in the production and supply or acquisition of the 
controlled goods or services, however this is not a 
consideration under section 36, whereas perhaps it 
should be. 
Finally, section 36 focusses on intent to cause 
certain situations. In determining intent there is 
opportunity for much subjective and therefore 
discretionary judgment. This creates uncertainty and 
results in high compliance costs. A danger is that 
if there are many successful actions, firms may be 
discouraged from becoming the leading firm in a 
market. 
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CONCLUSION 
The courts have not yet provided a landmark decision 
on section 36 containing statements that define and 
integrate the thresholds that it contains. This 
means that the critical distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate business activity is not 
yet clear. A major difficulty for the courts is that 
the task requires a reconciliation of economic 
concepts with a legal analytical process. There is 
also disagreement between judges as to what the 
thresholds are that must be crossed in order for 
firms to be in breach of the section. For instance, 
is there a use test, or does the purpose test form 
the limiting factor? If there is a use test, how is 
it defined, and is it more effective in 
distinguishing between competitive and anti-
competitive activity than a purpose test? If there 
is no use test and liability depends on a purpose 
test, how, given the words of the section, can one be 
sure the Act will be used to promote competition, 
rather by competitors as a weapon in the war against 
larger rivals? What is the desirable ambit of the 
section, and how is this affected by the issues just 
raised? In the absence of further government 
intervention, will the section adequately perform its 
expected role of controlling the development of 
competition in newly deregulated sectors? 
In summary, the arguments in this paper are that the 
approach to market definition taken in Port Nelson, 
although it may be more in line with the underlying 
economic concept of market power, is not either in 
line with the Act or practically applicable in a 
legal analysis. The Court's statement that actual 
dominance is not necessary is argued to be incorrect 
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on the basis that the legislation does not support 
it, and therefore the outcome of the case, if the 
relevant market is defined as the stevedoring market, 
could be challenged. The approach taken in Magic 
Millions is preferred as being more in line with the 
practical approach indicated in the Act. 
Dominance must be found in the relevant market. Once 
this threshold is crossed, section 36 catches acts 
performed in other markets than that in which 
dominance was found, if there was a use of dominance 
for a proscribed purpose. It is argued here that the 
words of the section intend a use test, and that a 
use test is more likely than a purpose test to 
distinguish competitive from anti-competitive 
activities. The purpose test is flawed by 
disagreement about the subjective or objective nature 
of the test, and the risk that it may be used by 
competitors in a way not intended by the Act. In the 
context of a use versus a purpose test, it is argued 
that the result in Magic Millions supports the 
existence of the use and purpose test combination 
over the purpose test standing alone. 
The purpose of this paper has been to define and 
discuss the issues that arise in the application of 
section 36. Due to the significance of the law of 
market dominance, and the comparatively large 
proportion of the New Zealand business community that 
has a dominant position in a market, the way these 
issues are resolved will have profound consequences 
for the way business is conducted in this country. 
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